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Abstract—Machine learning models have demonstrated vul-
nerability to adversarial attacks, more specifically misclassifi-
cation of adversarial examples. In this paper, we propose a one-
off and attack-agnostic Feature Manipulation (FM)-Defense to
detect and purify adversarial examples in an interpretable and
efficient manner. The intuition is that the classification result of
a normal image is generally resistant to non-significant intrinsic
feature changes, e.g., varying thickness of handwritten digits.
In contrast, adversarial examples are sensitive to such changes
since the perturbation lacks transferability. To enable manipu-
lation of features, a combo-variational autoencoder is applied
to learn disentangled latent codes that reveal semantic features.
The resistance to classification change over the morphs, derived
by varying and reconstructing latent codes, is used to detect
suspicious inputs. Further, combo-VAE is enhanced to purify
the adversarial examples with good quality by considering
both class-shared and class-unique features. We empirically
demonstrate the effectiveness of detection and the quality of
purified instance. Our experiments on three datasets show that
FM-Defense can detect nearly 100% of adversarial examples
produced by different state-of-the-art adversarial attacks. It
achieves more than 99% overall purification accuracy on
the suspicious instances that close the manifold of normal
examples.
Keywords-Adversarial attacks; artificial intelligence; defense;
latent representation; security
I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of adversarial examples causes serious secu-
rity concerns, particularly in casting doubt on the reliability
of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in the case of image
classification. These adversarial examples can be generated
by adding visually imperceptible perturbations into a normal
image to cause a DNN to mislabel the perturbed images
with high confidence [1], [2]. Such adversarial attacks may
lead to catastrophic consequences in applications such as
disease diagnosis and self-driving cars. Existing defensive
approaches proposed in the literature to defeat adversarial
threats can be mainly categorized as adversarial training,
defensive distillation and detecting/purifying adversarial ex-
amples. The first two methods involve the modification of
the protected classifier or require knowledge of the process
to generate adversarial examples. The third method aims
at identifying suspicious inputs from normal inputs using
hand-crafted statistical features [3], separate classification
networks [4], [5] or autoencoders [6]. Unfortunately, the
Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack [7] has demonstrated that most
existing detection approaches can be evaded. The efficient
detection of adversary examples without knowledge of ad-
versarial example generation, therefore, remains a challenge
for machine learning and security communities. This work
aims at an efficient detecting and purifying defense.
Existing detection-based defensive approaches include
Defense-GAN [8], MagNet [6], FBGAN [9] and Image
Transformation-based detection [5]. Defense-GAN trains
a GAN to generate the manifold of unperturbed images
and then finds the nearest point on the manifold to the
adversarial example as the denoising result. MagNet applies
detector networks to learn and differentiate between normal
and adversarial examples by approximating the manifold of
normal examples. Applying the reformer network moves
the adversarial examples towards the manifold of normal
examples to correctly reconstruct adversarial examples with
small perturbation. FBGAN extracts the semantic features
of the input images and reconstructs the denoised images
from these features. It uses the generative capability of
Bidirectional GAN and the mutual information (MI) regular-
ization between all the latent codes and the generated images
for disentanglement. Image Transformation-based detection
applies certain transformation operations on an image to
generate several transformed images. Then the classification
results of these transformed images are used to distinguish
between the normal and the adversarial. These approaches
present two significant drawbacks:
Feasibility. Element-wise metrics, such as the pixel-wise
squared error, are commonly adopted for reconstruction error
based adversarial detection, e.g., Magnet. As reconstruction
error is a continuous value, a threshold can be set as
a hyperparameter to decide whether the input is normal
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Figure 1: Illustration of the feature manipulation on normal
and adversarial images from the MNIST/FMNIST/CelebA
dataset. The first sub-figures are the illustration of the FM-Defense
by feature manipulating. We select ten latent codes that reveal
ten semantic features, e.g., the thickness (f13), azimuth (f16) and
stretching (f9) for MNIST digit ”7”, style features (f2, 3, 5) for
trouser shape in FMNIST, and face expression feature f1 for
CelebA face images. For each instance, we change every latent
code for n times to get n morphs, and record the predicted label
by a pre-trained classifier. The classification accuracy resistance
is evaluated by the proportion of unchanged predictions among
morphs. The histogram is the average resistance on classification
accuracy for 2000 clean and perturbed instances derived from four
adversarial attacks on MNIST and CelebA, respectively.
or adversarial. However, the reconstruction error of the
perturbed images derived from oblivious attacks (such as
the CW attack) is very likely similar to normal images. The
threshold should be as low as possible to identify slightly
perturbed adversarial examples, considering that too low
would significantly misjudge normal examples. Besides, for
image transformation-based detection, a mixture of normal
and adversarial examples is required in the training set to
train the classifier. This causes the high computational cost
to generate adversarial examples and adversarial classifiers,
particularly for more complex datasets and stronger attacks.
Further, the impact of external features transformation, such
as image rotation and shifting, is not consistent and general
for different instances. Besides, the background of an image
adds a large number of extra features to the object, which
is also sensitive to the external transformation.
Completeness. Generally, there are two types of semantic
features: class-shared (such as the thickness of the hand-
written digits, the facial expression of the face images) and
class-unique (such as different handwriting style for each
digit or the identification of face). However, the reformer of
MagNet and the generator of FBGAN and Defense-GAN can
only reconstruct/generate the purified instance using some
commonly shared feature. It leads to loss of class-unique
features, for example, different writing styles exclusive to
the digit ”2” (such as a flat stroke or across loop bottom);
such features become inactive for some classification tasks,
e.g., writer identification or face recognition. As the high
dimension space input, e.g., image, always lies in a complex
manifold, the underlying data distribution could be very
complex. The purifier should use complex enough models
to capture the true posterior by utilizing both class-shared
and class-unique features.
In this paper, we propose an adversarial example detec-
tion and purification method, named Feature-Manipulation
defense (FM-Defense), to address these two concerns. It
can effectively defeat the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks,
including CW attack. The intuition is that the classification
result of a normal image is generally resistant to non-
significant intrinsic feature changes, e.g., varying thickness
of handwritten digits or the facial expression. Namely, the
classification results of a normal digit and its morphs, de-
rived by varying thickness, are very likely to be stable, since
the significant features are retained. In contrast, adversarial
examples are sensitive to such changes. The reason is that
the unstructured perturbation is designed for a single image,
and may cause various impacts on its morphs due to lack
of transferability. Figure 1 demonstrates our intuition using
a handwritten digit, trouser shape and face image.
The key point to implement our intuition is how to
manipulate the intrinsic feature. Consequently, a one-off
combo-variational autoencoder (combo-VAE) is applied to
learn disentangled low-dimensional latent codes, i.e., one
latent code only affects one semantic feature. The learned
latent codes are disentangled, easy to control, and composed
of abundant internal semantic features, instead of external
features such as image rotation and shifting. The resistance
of classification accuracy when manipulating the intrinsic
features via disentangled latent codes is used to detect suspi-
cious inputs. As demonstrated in the histograms of Figure 1,
the classification accuracy change of clean instances is more
consistent than that of adversarial instances. Hence, a simple
threshold of classification accuracy resistance can be set to
easily distinguish normal and adversarial images instead of
training the adversarial classifier. Further, the combo-VAE
is also applied to purify the suspicious instances close to
the manifold of normal examples by reconstructing using
both class-shared and class-unique features to move them
towards the manifold. To the best of our knowledge, the FM-
Defense is the first attempt to apply disentangled learning
for effective defense against oblivious adversarial attacks via
both detection and purification, with good interpretability,
feasibility, and completeness.
Our contributions are summarized as follows. We first
present a key intuition that adversarial examples are gener-
ally more sensitive to intrinsic feature changes than normal
images. Based on this intuition, we then propose feature
manipulation-based adversarial example detection and pu-
rification method, FM-Defense. We use a combo-VAE to
manipulate the feature in an easy and interpretable manner.
Besides detection, the combo-VAE is used to purify the
suspicious inputs by reconstructing images based on both
class-unique and class-shared components. It can improve
the completeness of the reconstructed instance for purifi-
cation. We implement and evaluate the FM-Defense on
three image datasets, MNIST, FMNIST and CelebA, which
shows the superior performance in defending against various
adversarial attacks.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Autoencoders and β-VAE
Autoencoders (AEs) are common deep models in unsu-
pervised learning [10]. It aims to represent high-dimensional
data through the low-dimensional latent layer, a.k.a. bottle-
neck vector or code. Architecturally, AEs consist of two
parts, the encoder and decoder. The encoder part takes the
input x ∈ Rd and maps it to z (the latent variable of the
bottleneck vector). The decoder tries to reconstruct the input
data from z. The training process of autoencoders is to
minimize the reconstruction error. Formally, we can define
the encoder and the decoder as transitions τ1 and τ2:
τ1(X)→ Z
τ2(Z)→ Xˆ
τ1, τ2 = argmin
τ1,τ2
∥∥∥X − Xˆ∥∥∥2 (1)
The VAEs model shares the same structure with the au-
toencoders, but is based on an assumption that the latent
variables follow some kind of distribution, such as Gaussian
or uniform distribution. It uses variational inference for the
learning of the latent variables. In VAEs the hypothesis is
that the data is generated by a directed graphical model
p(x|z) and the encoder is to learn an approximation qφ(z|x)
to the posterior distribution pθ(z|x). The VAE optimizes the
variational lower bound:
L(θ, φ;x) = KL(qφ(z|x)||pθ(z))−Eqφ(z|x)[logpθ(x|z)]
(2)
The left part is the regularization term to match the posterior
of z conditional on x, i.e., qφ(z|x), to a target distribution
pθ(z) by the KL divergence. The right part denotes the
reconstruction loss for a specific sample x. In a training
batch, the loss can be averaged as:
LV AE = Epdata(x)[L(θ, φ;x)]
= Epdata(x)[KL(qφ(z|x)||pθ(z))]−
Epdata(x)[Eqφ(z|x)[logpθ(x|z)]]
(3)
β-VAE is a modification of the VAE framework that
introduces an adjustable hyperparameter β to the original
VAE objective:
L = Eqφ(logpθ(x|z))− βDKL(qφ(z|x)||pθ(z)) (4)
Well chosen values of β (usually β > 1) result in more
disentangled latent representations z. When β = 1, the β-
VAE becomes equivalent to the original VAE framework. It
was suggested that the stronger pressure for the posterior
qφ(z|x), to match the factorized unit Gaussian prior p(z)
introduced by the β-VAE objective, puts extra constraints
on the implicit capacity of the latent bottleneck z. Higher
values of β necessary to encourage disentangling often lead
to a trade-off between the fidelity of β-VAE reconstructions
and the disentangled nature of its latent code z (see Fig. 6
in [15]). This is due to the loss of information as it passes
through the restricted capacity latent bottleneck z.
B. Adversarial attacks
Evasion attacks have long been studied on machine learn-
ing classifiers [11], [12], and are practical against many types
of models [13]. These evasion attacks over neural networks
are referred to as adversarial examples [14]. Namely, for a
given input sample x, the adversarial example is a sample
x′ that is similar to x (according to particular measure
metrics) but so that the classifier’s decision C(x) 6= C(x′)
[13]. A classier can misclassify an adversarial example for
two reasons. (1) The adversarial example is far from the
boundary of the manifold of the task. For example, the
task is a handwritten digit classification, and the adversarial
example is an image containing no digit, but the classier
has no option to reject this example and is forced to output
a class label. (2) The adversarial example is close to the
boundary of the manifold. If the classier poorly generalizes
the manifold in the vicinity of the adversarial example, then
misclassification occurs.
Let U be the set of all instances in the sample space.
A classification function is denoted by C, which outputs
for each instance x ∈ U a predicted class C(x) = y. Let
Y = {y1, · · · , ym} denote the set of classes for a certain
classification task. Each classification function assumes a
data generation process that produces each instance x ∈ U
with probability p(x). Let N be a manifold that consists of
instances that act naturally with regard to a certain classifi-
cation task, following a data generation process. N can be
approximated by a set of natural instances for a classification
task [6], e.g., MNIST. The goal of the adversarial example
is to find certain perturbation on x to generate adversarial
example x∗ ∈ U \ N that fools a specific C to misclassify,
i.e. C(x∗) 6= C(x).
The adversary is assumed to have the knowledge of the
original classifier but is not aware of the detector and purifier.
Therefore, the goal of the adversary is only to fool the
unsecured classifier.
C. Adversarial defenses
Defense on neural networks is much harder compared
with attacks. We summarize some ideas of current ap-
proaches to defense and compare them to our work.
1) Adversarial Training: One idea of defending against
adversarial examples is to train a better classifier [15]. An
intuitive way to build a robust classifier is to include adver-
sarial information in the training process, which we refer to
as adversarial training. For example, one may use a mixture
of normal and adversarial examples in the training set for
data augmentation [14], or mix the adversarial objective with
the classification objective as regularizer [16]. Although this
idea is promising, it is hard to reason about what attacks
to train on and how important the adversarial component
should be. Currently, these questions are still unanswered.
2) Defensive Distillation: Defensive distillation [17]
trains the classifier in a certain way such that it is nearly
impossible for gradient-based attacks to generate adversarial
examples directly on the network. Defensive distillation
leverages distillation training techniques [18] and hides the
gradient between the pre-softmax layer (logits) and softmax
outputs. However, [19] showed that it is easy to bypass the
defense by adopting one of the three following strategies:
(1) choose a more proper loss function (2) calculate gradient
directly from pre-softmax layer instead of from post-softmax
layer (3) attack an easy-to-attack network first and then
transfer to the distilled network.
3) Detecting Adversarial Examples: The detection-based
defense against adversarial examples for a classifier C aims
to establish a detector dC : U→ Y∪{J}. J is the judgment
that the input is unlikely from the manifold of the normal
instances. Further, the purification-based defense is to build
a purifier p : U \N→ N to reconstruct suspicious instances
with small distortion only using some essential features, in
order to move adversarial examples towards the manifold of
normal examples. The defense aims to increase the accuracy
of the classifier with the presence of adversarial examples
by (1) detecting the input as an adversarial example or
a normal image while rejecting suspicious instances with
huge distortion; (2) purifying suspicious instances with small
distortion by reconstruction. One strong defense is to detect
adversarial examples with hand-crafted statistical features
[3] or separate classification networks [4]. A representative
work of this idea is [4]. For each attack generating method
considered, it constructed a DNN classifier (detector) to tell
whether an input is normal or adversarial. The detector was
directly trained on both normal and adversarial examples.
The detector showed good performance when the training
and testing attack examples were generated from the same
process, and the perturbation was large enough, but it did
not generalize well across different attack parameters and
attack generation processes.
III. DEFENSE VIA SEMANTIC FEATURE MANIPULATION
A. FM-Defense overview
We propose Feature Manipulation based defense (FM-
Defense), a framework for defending adversarial examples
via detecting and purifying.
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Figure 2: Scheme of FM-Defense.
Three key challenges need to be addressed by FM-
Defense: (1) How to make the feature manipulation feasible
in an interpretable manner? (2) How to improve the dis-
crimination ability of the detector to recognize adversarial
examples by manipulating features efficiently? (3) How
to enhance the quality and completeness of the purified
instances by reconstruction? To address these three issues,
FM-Defense is composed of three components:
(1) Representation with improved disentanglement. We
initially train a disentangle representation model, combo-
VAE, enhanced from β-VAE [20], on a clean dataset. The
objective here is to make disentangled latent codes that have
semantic meaning so that they are easy to be controlled.
Such models consist of two components: the encoder E :
X → Z takes the input x ∈ Rd and maps it to z (the latent
variable of the bottleneck vector). The decoder D : Z → X
tries to reconstruct the input data from z. The encoder can
map high-dimensional input instance x to disentangled low-
dimensional latent codes z, i.e., the one latent code can
only control one certain feature. The decoder is used to
reconstruct the input from the low-dimensional latent code z.
For simple images, e.g. 28×28 handwritten digits, the latent
code can be a m-dimensional vector. For complex images,
e.g. 128× 128 face images, the latent codes are m channels
of n×n feature maps. We find that some n×n-dimensions
feature map can reveal some disentangled semantic features
as well. Therefore, each channel of n × n feature map can
be considered as one latent factor used for manipulation for
simplicity, namely, each element of the n×n feature map is
simultaneously changed at the same scale. The combo-VAE
to extract the disentangled latent codes for each instance so
that it is feasible to select and manipulate a number of codes
that reveal the desired semantic features, e.g. thickness of the
digit. The feasibility of feature manipulation is related to
the disentanglement level. Therefore, strategies are used to
improve the disentanglement, as described in the following
sections.
(2) Detector with fine discrimination ability. Given an
instance, we first vary a latent code i for n times to
obtain n morphs reconstructed by the decoder. We then
record the ratio of unchanged classification prediction by
applying a certain classifier (to be protected) on these n
morphs compared with the original prediction. The ratio
is used as a resistance indicator r(i) for code i. At one
time, we change one of m selected latent codes in turn
and obtain a m-dimensional resistance vector −→r for each
instance. We find the resistance ability of normal instances
is significantly better than that of adversarial ones, as shown
in the histogram of Figure 1. Therefore, a m-dimensional
threshold configuration
−→
θr for all selected m latent codes
can be decided on the normal instance to distinguish normal
and adversarial instances. An instance, that meets r(i) >
θ
(i)
r , ∀ r(i) ∈ −→r , will be recognized as normal. Otherwise,
it is recognized as suspicious.
(3) Purifier with comprehensive reconstruction ability. It
is feasible to decide a threshold that can achieve nearly 100%
adversarial detection accuracy (True Positive). However, this
will cause a large number of normal instances to be im-
properly recognized as adversarial, i.e., high False Positive
ratio. We assume there exists a manifold of resistance on
clean instances. Therefore, we use another threshold θd over
the distance Dis(.) between the resistance vector of an
instance −→r and the resistance threshold vector −→θr , to build a
salvageable set consists of suspicious instances close to the
manifold of normal instances.
Dis(−→r ,−→θr) =
∑
|r(i) − θ(i)r |, ∀r(i) < θ(i)r (5)
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Figure 3: Threshold settings.
As illustrated in Figure 3, if a suspicious instance from
the detection has a distance of more than θd, then it will
be rejected as adversarial. Otherwise, it is incorporated in a
salvageable set that will be reconstructed by a combo-VAE
based purifier. The purifier moves suspicious examples in
the set towards the manifold of normal examples to correctly
classify adversarial examples with small distortion or clean
instances improperly recognized as adversarial. Namely, the
purifier reconstructs close approximation on the normal
manifold before feeding to the target classifiers. To improve
the quality of reconstructed instance, we enhance the combo-
VAE to absorb both significant class-unique features and
class-shared features. Details of these components are given
in the following sections.
B. Representation with improved disentanglement
VAE-based autoencoders and their variations are com-
monly applied for disentanglement learning. Specifically,
the encoder E, parameterized by qφ(z|x), is trained to
convert high-dimensional data x into the latent representa-
tion bottleneck vector z in the latent space that follows a
specific Gaussian distribution p(z) ∼ N(0, 1). The decoder
pθ(x|z) is trained to reconstruct the latent vector z to x. The
encoder and decoder are trained simultaneously based on
the negative reconstruction error and the regularization term,
i.e., Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between qφ(z|x) and
p(z). The regularization term is used to regularize the
distribution qφ(z|x) to be Gaussian distribution whose mean
µ and diagonal covariance
∑
are the output of the encoder.
We apply a combo-VAE to get good disentanglement in
z by improving the inner-independence of latent codes.
Specifically, Total Correlation (TC) [21] is used to encourage
independence in the latent vector z, as given in Equation 2.
TC(z) = KL(q(z)||q¯(z)) = Eq(z)[log q(z)
q¯(z)
] (6)
As TC is hard to obtain, the approximate tricks used in [22]
is applied to estimate TC. Specifically, a discriminator Dtc
is applied to classify between samples from q(z) and q¯(z).
Thus learning to approximate the density ratio is needed for
estimating TC [22]. Dtc, parameterized by υ, is trained with
other components jointly. Thus, the TC term is replaced by
the discriminator-based approximation as follows:
TC(z) ≈ Eq(z)[log D(z)
1−D(z) ] (7)
The objective of combo-VAE is augmented with a TC
[21] term to encourage independence in the latent factor
distribution as follows:
Eqφ(z|x(i))[logpθ(x
(i)|z)− LKL(qφ(z|x(i))||p(z))]− γLTC
(8)
Note that this is also a lower bound on the marginal
log likelihood Ep(x)[logp(x)]. The first part reveals the
reconstruction error, denoted by LR, evaluating whether the
latent bottleneck vector z is informative enough to recover
the original instance. LR can be defined as the l2 loss
between the original instance and the reconstructed instance.
The second part is a regularization term, denoted by LKL,
to push qφ(z|x) to match the prior distribution p(z). The
third part is the TC term, denoted by LTC , to measure the
dependence for multiple random variables.
As shown in Figure 2, the parameter φ of en-
coder qφ(z|x) is then trained by LKL, LR and LTC
in terms of −∇φ(LKL + LR + γLTC). The param-
eter θ of decoder is updated in terms of −∇θ(LR).
The parameter υ of TC-discriminator is updated in
terms of −∇υ(LT ), i.e. −∇υ 12|B| [
∑
i∈B log(Dυ(z
(i)) +∑
i∈B′ log(1−Dυ(permutedim(z′(i)))]. Here, the permute-
dim function is to random permutate on a sample in the batch
for each dimension of its z, similar with [22].
C. Detector with fine discrimination
The indicator for adversarial detection should easily dif-
ferentiate normal and adversarial instances, be feasible and
stable to conduct, and attack-agnostic. The classification
accuracy resistance over the morphs, derived from feature
manipulation by changing a certain latent code, can meet
these criteria. The discrimination ability of the detector
depends on the ability to reduce the false-positive ratio
(normal instances to be recognized as adversarial) and
the naturality of the morphs. Consequently, we apply two
strategies: normal value range selection and natural morph
generation.
Natural morph generation. The initial step is to find
the normal value range of each code on the clean valida-
tion set, then the morphs are produced via manipulating
each code within its normal value range. As the latent
codes are disentangled, independent (all from N(0, 1)) and
have semantic meaning, some latent codes that reveal non-
significant intrinsic features (e.g., thickness for handwritten
digits) will be selected and their normal range can be decided
empirically in an interpretable manner for human on a vali-
dation set. To obtain the morphs by feature manipulation, we
can incrementally add/reduce a fixed value on the original
learned latent codes within the normal range. However, the
modified latent vector maybe not be on the manifold of
normal instances. If that happens, an unnatural instance
will be reconstructed by the decoder. Hence, we conduct
an iterative stochastic search to make the morphs on the
manifold by adding natural noise. Specifically, we increase
the search range by ∆r within which the perturbation for a
certain latent code ∆zi is randomly sampled (B samples for
each iteration) until we produce N natural latent code with
the value in the normal value range to reconstruct N natural
morphs. We then evaluate the resistance on classification
for this latent code using the targeted classifier. Iterative,
we can get a m-dimensional resistance evaluation vector for
each instance.
Threshold selection strategies. Given a targeted classifier,
we decide a resistance threshold for each latent code on a
validation set containing only clean instances. The threshold
of resistance is decided for each factor so that the false-
positive rate on the validation set is below a pre-defined
value ρ (e.g. 90%). Therefore, we can decide a unified and
fixed resistance threshold for all latent codes or formulate a
specific threshold for each latent code in terms of ρ.
D. Purifier with comprehensive reconstruction
We assume that suspicious instances with small distance
between their resistance vector and the resistance threshold
vector can be consider as close to the manifold of the normal
instances. Namely the distance is under the θd, which is
set as the η% fractile on clean validation data. Therefore,
a VAE-based purifier is used to reconstruct and move them
towards the manifold of normal examples. In regular VAEs,
the prior over the latent variables is commonly an isotropic
Gaussian, resulting in limited representation because the
learned representation can only be unimodal and does not
allow for more complex representations [23]. Consequently,
the regular VAE-based disentangled learning generally learn
some class-shared information and with some essential class-
unique information lost. This limitation causes only the
suspicious instances with tiny perturbation, while suspicious
instances with larger perturbation, e.g. derived from FGSM
attack in Figure 6, can not be reconstructed correctly. To
address the completeness and accuracy of the VAE-based
purifier, we enhance the combo-VAE by incorporating class
relevant conditional information to guide the reconstruction.
Our latent codes consist of two components: class-unique
representation, zu (e.g., important features unique to each
digit), and commonly shared across all classes, zs (e.g.,
the thickness of handwriting digits). As shown in Figure 2,
the enhanced combo-VAE has a similar scheme to a VAE,
but instead of using exclusively the same data for the input
and output of the network, we use class-unique additional
information as an extra input to the decoder.
Specifically, we assume the observed instances are derived
from a mixture of Gaussians, i.e. the inference of the class
of an instance is equivalent to inferring which mode of
the latent codes zu of the data point was generated from.
Namely, we use a mixture of Gaussians as our prior for
the zu, used as conditional information for training decoder
of VAE. For each class label c, we assume it has K
features such as different writing styles for handwritten
digits, namely K-dimensional zu. Therefore, we first train a
deep neural network using Gaussian Mixture loss (DGMM)
that maps input x to zu that is learned with the supervision
of the categorical class label c. zu reveals K features for the
label of a given input instance. The DGMM is solely trained
using the clean labeled instances, and the output is a logistic
regression on the latent representation of K features, as a
classification task.
Each feature z(k)u follows a mixture of K Gaussian
distribution with learned mean µc and covariance Σc for
each class c, given by neural networks of DGMM with
parameters κµ and κΣ respectively.
p(z(k)u ) =
C∑
c
N(c;µc,Σc)p(c) (9)
Here, p(c) is the prior probability of class c. The loss
of DGMM is calculated as the cross-entropy between the
posterior probability q(c|zu) and the corresponding one-
hot class labels, denoted Lcls, combined with a likelihood
regularization term to force the training samples to obey the
assumed GM distribution, denoted Llkd [23], [24]. Lcls can
let zu contain as much label information as possible, as the
MI between zu and class c are added to the maximization
objective function.
Lcls = −Eqκ(zu|x)
∑
c
I(c = y)log q(c|zu)
= −log N(zu;µy,Σy)p(y)∑
kN(zu;µk,Σk)p(k)
(10)
Llkd is applied for measuring to what extent the training
samples fit the assumed distribution, which can be simplified
as Equation 7 when p(c) is simply set to 1/C for all classes.
The Llkd for a given class c is given as follows:
Llkd = −logN(zu;µc,Σc) (11)
Consequently, the loss for DGMM is
LGM = Lcls + λlkdLlkd, (12)
where λ is a non-negative weighting coefficient.
In addition, an encoder Es is trained to map input x
to zs where each code is forced to follow the standard
Gaussian N(0, I), implemented completely by the qφ(z|x)
in Section Representation with improved disentanglement.
The input of a pre-trained DGMM can a given instance x
without a label, since DGMM will output the K-dimensional
feature vector of the most likely class of x. The latent
codes zs and K-dimensional zu derived from the pre-trained
DGMM are then simply concatenated together to a decoder
to reconstruct the input x. The loss of decoder is used
to measure how probable is to generate x by using the
distribution p(x|zu, zs), that is, is a distance between x and
reconstructed x.
The training of combo-VAE is two-stages. Initially, the
DGMM (modeled by qκ) is updated using LGM to learn
mean µc and covariance Σc of the prior p(zu|c), encouraging
zu to be label dependent and follows a learned Gaussian
mixture distribution. At the second step, the encoder Es
and the decoder are trained jointly to reconstruct images
with concatenated zs and zu. The Encoder Es (modeled
by qφ) is intended to extract class-shared code zs. This is
trained by Lkl and LR to make zs be close to N(0, 1). Then
the decoder pθ generates a reconstruction image using the
combined feature of zs and zu with the loss LR.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
The performance of FM-Defense is evaluated against the
state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on two datasets: MNIST
[25], FMNIST (2D shapes) [26] and CelebA [27] (Face).
The robustness of FM-Defense is evaluated against the
untargeted black-box attack as a worst-case performance
scenario. The adversaries are assumed have no knowledge
about the detector and purifier. They only focus on generat-
ing adversarial examples that aim to maximize the prediction
errors on a target classifier, and do not care which class the
victim classifier outputs as long as it is different from the
ground truth.
A. Setup
On MNIST, FMNIST and CelebA, 20,000 clean examples
are chosen for training one-off combo-VAE. We randomly
select 5000 clean images (named CLE, labeled 0) and
the corresponding 5000 adversarial examples (named ADV,
labeled 1), respectively. These datasets are used to test the
efficiency of the FM-Defense. Besides, another 2000 clean
instances are chosen as the validation data (named VAL) to
decide thresholds. We trained a classifier for MNIST using
the setting in [19] with an accuracy of 99.4%. We train
a classifier using the setting in [28] for FMNIST. For the
CelebA, we train an identification classifier using the setting
in [29] with an accuracy of 94.7%. We normalized the data
between 0 and 1 instead of [0, 255] for simplicity. Table
1 shows the architectures of the combo-VAE for MNIST,
FMNIST, and CelebA.
Table I: The network structures. N=Neurons, K=Kernel size, S=Stride size. Convolutional layer is denoted by C. or DC.
The residual basic block is denoted as RSB.
Encoder/DGMM Face Encoder Decoder Face Encoder
C.ReLU N32,K4,S2 C.LReLU N64,K7,S1 Dense.ReLU 128/512 RSB. N512,K3,S1
C.ReLU N32,K4,S2 C.LReLU N128,K3,S2 Dense.ReLU N64,K4 RSB. N512,K3,S1
C.ReLU N64,K4,S2 C.LReLU N256,K3,S2 C.LReLU N64,K4,S2 RSB. N512,K3,S1
C.ReLU N64,K4,S2 RSB. N512,K3,S1 C.LReLU N32,K4,S2 DC.LReLU N256,K3,S2
Dense 128 RSB. N512,K3,S1 C.LReLU N32,K4,S2 DC.LReLU N128,K3,S2
Dense 2*10 RSB. N512,K3,S1 C.LReLU N1,K4,S2 DC.LReLU N3,K7,S1
We used fast gradient sign method (e.g., FGSM ( =
0.3, L∞) [30]), DeepFool (L∞) [31], [19], and CW (L2)
attack [31], [19] for the experiments, implemented using
Fooling box [32] . We select 20-dimensional latent codes to
manipulate MNIST and 10-dimensional for FMNIST. The
face image will be mapped into 256 channels of 64*64
feature maps, and each channel is considered as one latent
factor. We generate 100 morphs for each latent factor of
instance by varying each latent code for 100 times within
according normal value range. The morphs were fed into the
target classifier to calculate the resistance vector for each in-
stance. For MNIST and FMNIST, we decided the resistance
threshold vector, respectively, such that the false-positive
rate of the detector on the validation set VAL is at most
0.001 for all sleeted latent codes. This means each detector
mistakenly rejects no more than 0.1% clean instances in the
validation set, i.e., ρ = 99.9%. Besides, distance threshold
values are decided for MNIST and FMNIST, respectively,
set as the η = 90% fractile on clean validation data in
our experiments. Other default hyper-parameters are given
as follows: γ = 40, λlkd = 0.1. For the face images of
CelebA, we find that only one randomly selected 64*64
feature map as a latent factor can achieve well-detecting
performance, approximately 100%, even without the TC-
optimization mentioned in Section 2.3. Therefore, a basic
combo-VAE without optimization strategies is used for face
images and only one latent factor (64*64 feature map) is
used for detection.
B. Defense evaluation against adversarial attacks
1) Detection accuracy evaluation.: We first evaluate the
performance of the detector for varying resistance thresh-
olds. The overall results on MNIST are shown in the first
row of Figure 4 in terms of adversarial, clean and overall
detection accuracy. Here, we test on both CLE and ADV
datasets, respectively. The correct decision is that adversarial
examples are recognized as 1 while normal ones as 0.
Initially, we use a unified resistance threshold for all selected
latent codes. The adversarial detection accuracy (legend as
Adv) is the proportion of adversarial instances in ADV to
be recognized as adversarial, i.e. True-Positive. The clean
detection accuracy (legend as Clean) is the proportion of
clean instances in CLE to be recognized as clean, i.e.
True-Negative. The overall detection accuracy (legend as
Overall) is the proportion of all correctly detected instances
in both ADV and CLE. We observe that even for a small
resistance threshold, e.g. 5, it can detect more than 75%
adversarial examples, and retaining 81% clean instances
correctly labeled. The adversarial detection accuracy of FM-
Defense on ADV is above 99.9% for both MNIST and
FMNIST on all the potential attacks, including CW attack
(99.9% adversarial detection accuracy at united resistance
threshold 85 with 13% correctly recognized clean instances).
Note that we achieved such high accuracy without any
adversarial examples required and only based on threshold
vectors that are easy to be decided experimentally.
However, the False-Positive (FP) rate of normal instances
increases as the resistance threshold and adversarial detec-
tion accuracy rise. The major concern here is how to balance
the adversarial detection accuracy and the FP rate. Combin-
ing the correctly recognized normal instances and adversarial
instances together, the overall detection accuracy reaches
the best at nearly 80% on the threshold at 30, which can
be used as a balanced threshold, with 85− 93% adversarial
detection accuracy and 75% clean detection accuracy. These
results demonstrate that our method can efficiently thwart
adversarial examples while achieving an acceptable FP rate.
We also demonstrate the impacts of choosing different
threshold selection strategies, i.e., varying the ρ to decide
a specific resistance threshold for each latent code and
selecting different codes. As shown in the second row
of Figure 4, both adversarial detection accuracy and FP
rate (1-clean detection accuracy) increase as the ρ rises.
Hence, it is feasible to decide a ρ that can balance the
adversarial detection accuracy and FP rate. Overall, the
specific resistance threshold strategy performs better than the
unified threshold, with relatively high adversarial detection
accuracy. In addition, we find that selecting different latent
codes affects detection accuracy. As shown in the third row
of Figure 4, selecting latent codes for FM-Defense against
the CW attack over MNIST has various discriminatory
ability. It is feasible to decide an efficient code selection
configuration experimentally. The third row of Figure 4 are
results on FMNIST(2D) dataset, which confirms the findings
mentioned above. The last row is the resistance statistics
on face images. For complex image, it is interesting to
find that the clean images are more resistant to the latent
factor change within a certain value range, reaching to
100%. In contrast, the adversarial ones are more sensitive
to such change, totally below 80%. Therefore, it is feasible
to use a higher resistance, e.g. 90%, to detect all adversarial
examples (detection accuracy = 100% and FP rate=0).
Figure 4: Detection accuracy evaluation on MNIST, FM-
NIST and CelebA.
2) Purification accuracy evaluation: We then evaluate
the purification performance of our approach on the de-
tected suspicious instances. First, we calculate the distance
between the resistance vector of a given instance and the
resistance threshold vector to establish a salvageable set for
purification. The set includes only adversarial examples and
misclassified clean instances.
We measure the recall in Figure 5, i.e., the proportion
of detected suspicious instances in the salvageable set that
are regained the correct labels after reconstruction, as vary
the distance threshold θd (set at the fractile of η%, i.e. how
many salvageable instances are purified) as well as resistant
threshold θr (unified threshold for simplicity). There are
three types of recall: clean recall, adversarial recall, and
overall recall to reveal the correctly recovered proportion
on ADV, CLE, and combination. We also record the final
accuracy of FM-Defense, namely TP + FP + RecoveredSalvageable .
The first row of Figure 5 is the results on MNIST. When θr
is 60% or 100%, more than 95− 98% adversarial instances
are recognized while about 80% clean instances are wrongly
labeled. As η (i.e. θd) rises, the adversarial and clean recall
after purification slightly decreases but retains a high level
(more than 95%). Nearly 90% adversarial instances and
100% clean instances in the salvageable set are recovered to
the correct label when the η is 10%. The final accuracy of
FM-Defense increases as the η goes up, reaching 99% when
the distance threshold is 100 (all salvageable instances are
purified). In addition, all the recall values and final accuracy
increase when rising θr. This reveals that we can set a
high resistance threshold to make all adversarial instance
to be detected without concerns about the FP ratio since
our purifier can well recover both the adversarial instances
and wrongly recognized clean ones in the suspicious set.
The experiments on FMNIST (2D) demonstrate the same
conclusions, as shown in the second row of Figure 5.
Figure 5: Purification results for CW attack with varying
distance threshold.
The last row illustrates the performance on the face
image. As the FP rate is 0, namely all clean images are
recognized as normal and total recall of detection is 100%.
Consequently, the key point here is to select the proportion
of the suspicious (adversarial) images for purification, i.e.
η. As shown, it feasible to choose a suitable η to achieve a
100% final accuracy. However, the final accuracy and the
percentage of selected adversarial images recovered to a
normal decrease when increasing the η. The reason is that
some adversarial examples have impacted the significant
characters of identification.
These results confirm that our detector and purifier can
efficiently recognize adversarial examples that far from the
manifold of normal instances. They also can effectively
move the misclassified clean instances and the salvageable
adversarial examples towards the normal manifold.
3) Purification quality evaluation: We further illustrate
the quality of the purified instances through reconstruc-
tion by our combo-VAE, and compare it with other VAE-
based generative models, e.g. Factor-VAE [22]. We show
the purified images on the MNIST, FMNIST and CelebA
datasets in Figure 6. It reveals that samples reconstructed
by ours can retain more class-unique features on clean
instances compared with Factor-VAE. The performance of
ours on reconstructing adversarial examples is much better
than Factor-VAE, as DGMM is used to capture more class
relevant information that can guide reconstruction. There-
fore, our defense has better generalization ability and can
purify more plentiful adversarial examples instead of only
these small distortion.
Figure 6: Purification quality illustration.
4) Overall evaluation with comparisons: Table 2 shows
the effects of our defense against different adversarial attacks
on the MNIST and CelebA, comparing with the state-of-the-
art defenses, e.g., MagNet, Defense-GAN and FBGAN.
For MNIST, without FM-Defense, the accuracy of the
classifier is 99.4%; with FM-Defense, the accuracy is re-
duced to 98.3%. This small reduction is negligible. As
illustrated in the table, the defense performance of FM-
Defense with maximum defense abilities of MagNet, and
Defense-GAN. Tables 2 show the performances of defense
methods on the MNIST and the FMNIST datasets, respec-
tively. As shown, the performance of FM-Defense exceeds
that of MagNet on all oblivious attacks (DeepFool and CW).
FM-Defense also outperforms FB-GAN and Defense-GAN
on the FGSM attack. Overall, FM-Defense shows the best
performance against all evaluated attacks. These evaluations
provide empirical evidence that FM-Defense is effective,
easy to conduct and generalizes well to different attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose FM-Defense, a one-off and
attack-agnostic defense that effectively detects and purifies
state-to-the-arts adversarial attacks. The assumption of our
defense is that the perturbation is lack of transferability.
FM-Defense applies a combo-VAE for both the adversarial
detection and salvageable instance purification. FM-Defense
achieves high accuracy against the state-of-the-art attacks,
especially for complex images, delivering empirical evi-
dence that our assumptions are likely correct. The combo-
VAE with two enhanced encoders is used to reconstruct
salvageable candidates for purification. However, before we
discover stronger justification or proof, it is not appropriate
to dismiss the possibility that the good performance of FM-
Defense is attributed to the state-of-the-art attacks that are
not strong enough. We hope that our findings would provoke
further explorations on designing more powerful attacks
even more practical anomaly detection.
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